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“I know that this program has saved lives. I know we’ve disrupted
plots. I know this program alone is worth more than the FBI, the
Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency put
together, have been able to tell us.”
George Tenet, former CIA Director,
on the CIA’s interrogation techniques1
“I don’t care what George Tenet says. I know what’s right. I
know what’s morally right as far as America’s behavior . . . .
We’ve gotten a huge amount of misinformation as well as other
information from these techniques.”
Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.)2
I. INTRODUCTION
The Miranda warnings are familiar to almost all Americans who have
watched television or seen a movie at any time since the Supreme Court
decided Miranda v. Arizona.3 The rules have evolved over the years,
and difficult issues of proof may arise, but litigants, attorneys, and
judges fundamentally know how Miranda works. Suspects have the
right to remain silent, the right to have an attorney present for questioning,
and the right to have an attorney appointed to represent them if they
cannot afford one.4 Nevertheless, few areas of law provoke more
consistent debate than interrogation and confessions, and Miranda’s
exclusion of incriminating statements in some criminal cases has only
added to the controversy.5 Moreover, the war on terror has complicated
the issues and raised the stakes.6

1. 60 Minutes: At the Center of the Storm (CBS television broadcast Apr. 29,
2007).
2. Katherine Shrader, Tenet Memoir Draws Heat from Key Players, ASSOCIATED
PRESS NEWSWIRES, Apr. 30, 2007.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. If a suspect is interrogated while in custody, the officer has to inform the
suspect of his or her rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present for
questioning, and the suspect must waive those rights or statements made by the suspect
will be inadmissible at trial. Id. at 444.
5. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 291 (2d ed.
1992).
6. “[C]laims of violations of human-rights law or the Constitution must be
evaluated in the context of the realities created by Sept. 11.” John C. Yoo, Perspectives
on the Rules of War: Sept. 11 Has Changed the Rules, S.F. CHRON., June 15, 2004, at
B9, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/06/15/EDGKJ766AM1.
DTL.
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When discussing terrorism, the situation most often presented is the
“ticking bomb” scenario. This is the hypothetical situation in which
the authorities want to interrogate a suspect in custody regarding his
knowledge about a bomb that has been set to explode or a planned
terrorist attack.7 Is this suspect entitled not to incriminate himself? What
about the presence of an attorney or the right to remain silent?8 In fact,
are the interrogators permitted to force the suspect, even to the point of
torture, to get an answer? We normally condemn forceful tactics, but
with numerous lives on the line, “the issue of torture gets complicated
and the easy pieties don’t so easily apply.”9 Commentator Charles
Krauthammer addressed the torture issue as follows:
Question: If you have the slightest belief that hanging this man by his
thumbs will get you the information to save a million people, are you permitted
to do it?
Now, on most issues regarding torture, I confess tentativeness and
uncertainty. But on this issue, there can be no uncertainty: Not only is it
permissible to hang this miscreant by his thumbs. It is a moral duty.10

In reality, of course, the more likely scenario is one in which several
suspects are in custody, and one or more of them may have knowledge
relevant to a planned terrorist attack but many others will have no such
knowledge.11 What rights are to be accorded the suspects in that
situation?
7. See George J. Terwillinger, III, “Domestic Unlawful Combatants”: A Proposal
to Adjudicate Constitutional Detentions, ENGAGE, Oct. 2006, at 55, 55 (setting forth a
similar scenario).
8. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 152 (2006) (“The Fifth Amendment’s right to remain silent . . . applies only in
the criminal justice system.”). Yoo details the problems of providing similar rights to
terrorist suspects. Id. at 152–53.
9. Charles Krauthammer, The Truth About Torture, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 5, 2005,
at 21, 22, available at http://weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/
400rhqav.asp.
10. Id.
11. Krauthammer addresses this point as follows:
Sure, the (nuclear) scale is hypothetical, but in the age of the car-and suicidebomber, terrorists are often captured who have just set a car bomb to go off or
sent a suicide bomber out to a coffee shop, and you only have minutes to find
out where the attack is to take place . . . .
And even if the example I gave were entirely hypothetical, the
conclusion—yes, in this case even torture is permissible—is telling because it
establishes the principle: Torture is not always impermissible. However rare
the cases, there are circumstances in which, by any rational moral calculus,
torture not only would be permissible but would be required (to acquire life-
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To adequately address this issue, we must resolve certain other
questions, including: Do standard criminal procedure laws apply?
Where are the suspects being held—in or outside of the United
States? What is their citizenship status? Do they qualify as prisoners
of war?12 How urgent is the supposed threat? How reliable is the
information known by the authorities? Can torture ever be justified,
and how is it defined?13 What about psychological pressure? What is
the consequence of violating the rights of the detainee/prisoner?
What international obligations apply?14

Id.

saving information). And once you’ve established the principle, to paraphrase
George Bernard Shaw, all that’s left to haggle about is the price. In the case of
torture, that means that the argument is not whether torture is ever permissible,
but when—i.e., under what obviously stringent circumstances: how big, how
imminent, how preventable the ticking time bomb.

12. Torture is illegal, regardless of whether or not a particular captive qualifies as a
“prisoner of war” under the Geneva Conventions, but coercive interrogation methods are
not necessarily “torture.” The law leaves substantial room for the use of these tactics by
both the military and the CIA. David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The McCain
Amendment Is Flawed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2005, at A11 (arguing that by equating
stressful interrogations with torture critics have “wrongly painted the Bush administration’s
policies as illegal”).
13. In the press and in academic discussions it is common to distinguish between
“torture,” in which physical assaults on the body of the victim result in excruciating pain,
and the category of “torture lite” or “stress and duress” techniques, which include
depriving subjects of food, sleep, light, or water, subjecting them to loud noises or bright
lights, shackling them in painful positions, and depriving them of medical attention.
Seth F. Kreimer, “Torture Lite,” “Full Bodied” Torture, and the Insulation of Legal
Conscience, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 187, 188 n.3 (2005). The leading
international judicial decision relates to Britain’s use of five stress methods against the IRA,
including “wall standing,” hooding, sleep deprivation, reduced rations, and constant loud
noise. The court found that this was not torture, but did constitute cruel and inhuman
treatment when used in combination. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 26–27 (1978).
The infamous Bybee Memo of August 1, 2002, defined physical torture as the
infliction of “excruciating and agonizing physical . . . pain” that is “equivalent to the pain
that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ failure,
or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will likely result.”
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel
to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–
2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 2002 OLC LEXIS 19. This definition was repudiated in a
memorandum of December 30, 2004. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant
Att’y Gen., to James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., Legal Standards Applicable Under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
olc/18usc23402340a2.htm.
14. See James A. Deeken, Note, A New Miranda for Foreign Nationals? The
Impact of Federalism on International Treaties that Place Affirmative Obligations on
State Governments in the Wake of Printz v. United States, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
997 (1998); Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional
Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278 (2003).
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Many of these questions go beyond the scope of this Article, but the
rights of terrorist suspects and the potential applicability of Miranda is
much more than a hypothetical question. Governmental sources, academic
commentators, and the media have all recently devoted a great deal of
attention to these subjects.15
An American citizen arrested within the United States would certainly
have the right not to incriminate himself. A foreign national arrested outside
of the U.S. would presumably not be protected.16 Other scenarios present
more difficult issues.17 American courts, therefore, have to determine
whether the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination applies
to non-American citizens, and whether an American police or military
agent conducting an investigation abroad must provide some type of
warnings before conducting an interrogation.18 The initial question
would seem to be whether terrorist suspects are even entitled to the right
protected by Miranda—the right not to incriminate themselves.

15. See Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The International Arena: A
Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal For a New Miranda
Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2002); M. K. B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and
Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 319 (2003);
Robert L. Bartley, A ‘Miranda’ Warning for Saddam?, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2003, at A11,
available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/rbartley/?id=110003743; Andrew
C. McCarthy, McCain & Miranda: “Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading” May Prove More
Dangerous than Meets the Eye, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Dec. 15, 2005, http://search.
nationalreview.com/ (search using search term “Prove More Dangerous,” follow “McCain &
Miranda” hyperlink).
16. But see United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 270–71 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (holding that FBI agents sent to Afghanistan to interrogate captured members of
the al Qaeda network had to abide by constitutional limitations, saying: “The Supreme
Court cases on point suggest that the Fourth Amendment applies to United States
citizens abroad . . . . Thus, this Court finds that even though the searches at issue in this
case occurred in Kenya, El-Hage can bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.”). As the
United States continues to fight the war against terrorism and seek out terrorist activity
located outside of this nation, interrogations of non-American citizens by American
officials will undoubtedly increase both in number and importance.
17. The Bin Laden court said, “The Government seems to concede the general
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to American citizens abroad . . . .” Id. at 270.
18. Complicating these questions is the fact that the laws of many foreign nations
do not provide suspects with the full range of rights embodied in Miranda, such as the
right to remain silent or the right to speak to an attorney. Thus, informing a foreign
national of these rights might actually mislead the suspect, at least as to any prosecution
that might take place in that nation, as opposed to the United States. Godsey, supra note
15, at 1708.
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II. THE LAW OF SELF-INCRIMINATION
The history of the privilege against self-incrimination in Great Britain
extends back more than 400 years,19 and scholars have long debated both
its merits and its defects.20 In the days of the Star Chamber, procedures
such as the rack and other instruments of torture were often used to
obtain confessions.21 The practice of using harsh tactics to compel an
accused to speak against himself gradually became such a problem that
courts ultimately prohibited all parties, including criminal defendants,
from testifying as witnesses at their trials.22
19. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH
CRIMINAL TRIAL 42–43 (3d ed. 1963) (describing 1568 Court of Common Pleas’ release
of defendant imprisoned for not answering judge’s questions).
20. See, e.g., id. at 48–57 (summarizing criticism of privilege by Jeremy
Bentham); 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 229–41 (photo.
reprint 1978) (1827) (criticizing exclusion of self-incriminating evidence because the
innocent would want to speak, and therefore the privilege would only protect the guilty);
Ian Dennis, Instrumental Protection, Human Right or Functional Necessity? Reassessing
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 342, 342–53 (1995)
(concluding that the system should apply the privilege in limited contexts and not view it
as a human right); David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1986) (describing the privilege as a
historical relic).
21. See WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 38–40 (describing development of privilege
over hundreds of years). Some historians date the beginning of the concept of a privilege
to 1637, with the trial of John Lilburn, a Star Chamber case. The Trial of John Lilburn
and John Wharton, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
459 (1966) (identifying Lilburn as a critical historical event in development of privilege).
Parliament abolished the Star Chamber after this trial. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459
(noting the Star Chamber’s fall following the Lilburn trial). Other scholars trace the
privilege even further back in time. See MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 244 n.2 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) (noting the view that the
privilege dates back to canon law); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 n.27 (noting that some
commentators find analogous principles in the Bible).
22. Scott Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IOWA L. REV. 482, 485–90
(1939). See WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 43 (describing procedures regarding defendant
as witness in 1700s). As for torture creating a “problem,” consider:
Torture is not always to be trusted, nor is it always to be disbelieved: it is a
delicate, dangerous and deceptive thing. For many persons have such strength
of body and soul that they heed pain very little, so that there is no means of
obtaining the truth from them; while others are so susceptible to pain that they
will tell any lie rather than suffer it.
James Ross, A History of Torture, in TORTURE 3, 6 (Kenneth Roth & Minky Worden
eds., 2005) (quoting THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, bk. 48, ch. 18, § 1).
Those wretched women, whose minds have already been disturbed by the
delusions and arts of the devil and are now upset by frequent torture, . . . and
constantly dragged out to undergo atrocious torment until they would gladly
exchange at any moment this most bitter existence for death, are willing to
confess whatever crimes are suggested to them rather than be thrust back into
their hideous dungeon among recurring torture.
Id. at 11–12 (quoting 2 HENRY CHARLES LEA, MATERIALS TOWARD A HISTORY OF
WITCHCRAFT 524–25 (Arthur C. Howland ed., Thomas Yoseloff 1957) (1939)).
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A complete ban on all testimony from parties was eventually recognized
as an obstacle in the pursuit of truth, and the prohibition was lifted.23
Criminal defendants were permitted to testify, but they also had the right
not to testify.24 Judges, however, could comment on a defendant’s
failure to testify.25
Following English common law, early American courts permitted the
introduction of confessions without restriction, even if law enforcement
officials had abridged the rights of those being interrogated.26 The key issue

23. The House of Commons passed the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898. See
WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 45–48 (noting that the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 was
developed to counteract unmerited acquittals resulting from defendants not testifying);
see also Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36 (Eng.) (changing rules
regarding competency of witnesses).
24. See Criminal Evidence Act § 1(a) (stating that the charged person “shall be a
competent witness,” but “shall [only] be called . . . upon his own application”).
25. See WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 59–63. In addition, once a defendant elected
to testify, the Act compelled him to answer incriminating questions. Id.
26. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 5, at 294. Of course, torture was prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102
(1976) (“[T]he primary concern of the drafters was to proscribe ‘torture[s]’ and other
‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976)
(tracing the ban on cruel and unusual punishment to the English Bill of Rights of 1689,
which prohibited punishments “unauthorized by statute and beyond the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court”). This, however, applies only to actions that constitute “punishment.”
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 852–53 (1998). See generally
Ronald J. Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the
Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299 (1990).
The Lieber Code, drafted by German-American political philosopher Francis Lieber
for Abraham Lincoln, was promulgated to the Union forces on April 24, 1863. It
provides, inter alia:
Article 16: Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction
of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or
wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not
admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a
district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy . . . .
....
Article 56: A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public
enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of
any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation,
death, or any other barbarity.
....
Article 76: Prisoners of war shall be fed upon plain and wholesome food,
whenever practicable, and treated with humanity.
Francis Lieber, General Orders No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in RICHARD SHELLY
HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 48, 56, 59 (1983).
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was whether the confession was reliable.27 Too often, forcibly extracted
confessions were given by the suspects solely to stop the interrogation.28 This
focus on reliability dominated American confession law well into the
twentieth century.29
In the 1944 case Ashcraft v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court discussed
interrogation methods known as the “third degree.”30 These techniques
were used to obtain confessions without brutal force, but with things like
powerful lights, persistent questioning over numerous hours, and deprivation
of sleep.31 The Court held that where the manner of interrogation was
inherently coercive, the confession would be inadmissible regardless of
reliability.32 Moreover, if impermissible methods were used, a confession
would be inadmissible regardless of the impact that those methods had
or did not have on that particular defendant.33

27. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 5, at 294. The history of this approach extends
back to ancient Rome. “Torture had been common to the late Roman Empire. Its
legitimacy was denied by Christendom, and it was slowly abolished . . . .” ROUSAS JOHN
RUSHDOONY, THE INTENT OF THE LAW 120 (1999). See also Ross, supra note 22, at 6
(“Instead of questioning the method, the [Romans] surrounded it with a jurisprudence
that was designed to give greater assurance to its reliability, a jurisprudence that is
admirable in its scepticism and unsettling in its logic.” (quoting EDWARD PETERS,
TORTURE 35 (expanded ed., Univ. of Pa. Press 1996) (1985))).
28. Torture is a kind of evidence, which appears trustworthy, because a sort
of compulsion is attached to it. . . . [Actually, however, t]hose under
compulsion are as likely to give false evidence as true, some being ready to
endure everything rather than tell the truth, while others are equally ready to
make false charges against others, in the hope of being sooner released from
torture.
Ross, supra note 22, at 5 (quoting ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC §§ 1376b–1377a (W. Rhys
Roberts trans., 1954) (350 B.C.E.)). The actual number of false confessions is unknown
and probably unknowable. It is certainly subject to debate. Compare Paul G. Cassell,
The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful
Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 529 (1999) (“false
confessions occur quite infrequently”), with Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice
in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998)
(arguing that confessions are much more common).
29. See Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65
VA. L. REV. 859, 863 (1979). Military commissions still look to see whether information
is relevant and reliable in order to decide issues of admissibility. YOO, supra note 8, at
218–19.
30. 322 U.S. 143, 150 n.5 (1944).
31. Id. at 150 n.6. The Court found Ashcraft’s confession involuntary, compelled,
and thus inadmissible. Id. at 153. This conclusion was based on Ashcraft’s continual
relay-style interrogation over a period of thirty-six hours without rest. Id.
32. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 n.2 (1949) (stating that if circumstances
indicate that the confession was not given by the free will of the defendant, it will not be
deemed voluntary and therefore will be inadmissible, even though the statements may be
reliable).
33. The Court has noted, however, that the characteristics of a particular defendant
might subject him or her to particular peril. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
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Of course, virtually all confessions are “involuntary” to some extent.34
As one author put it: “[B]y any standards of human discourse, a criminal
confession can never truly be called voluntary. With rare exception, a
confession is compelled, provoked, and manipulated from a suspect by a
detective who has been trained in a genuinely deceitful art.”35 Critics
also argued that the voluntariness test permitted too much pressure to be
applied on suspects, as it only prohibited prosecutors from using evidence
obtained by “interrogation methods that would exert so much pressure
that the suspect would admit to facts regardless of whether she believed
in the truth of the facts admitted.”36 Nevertheless, the voluntariness rule
still exists, though it is often overshadowed by Miranda.37
In the 1950s, the Supreme Court established the so-called McNabbMallory rule.38 Based on a federal statute39 and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,40 this rule held that a criminal defendant had to be
arraigned without unnecessary delay and that any confession obtained
during such a delay could be excluded from evidence in any subsequent

165 (1986) (“[M]ental condition is surely relevant to an individual’s susceptibility to
police coercion . . . .”).
34. “Although confession may be good for the soul, it is lousy for the defense.
Thus, in a typical case, to obtain statements from unwilling suspects, officers themselves
must employ some form of deception.” Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 109, 154 (1984) (footnote omitted). See also PETER BROOKS,
TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE 8–64 (2000)
(discussing some of the deep-seated psychological and cultural reasons why suspects
choose to speak to the police and confess); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really
Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1828–
29 (1987) (discussing a suspect’s “almost irresistible impulse to respond to . . . accusations”);
Claudio Salas, Note, The Case for Excluding the Criminal Confessions of the Mentally
Ill, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243, 254–55 (2004) (listing reasons why suspects feel
compelled to confess).
35. DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 199 (1991).
36. Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L.
REV. 2001, 2011–12 (1998).
37. In Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, a man heard voices that commanded him to do
things. One of those things was to make a confession. Id. at 174–75 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Lower courts, based on testimony from psychologists, concluded that this
was not voluntary and therefore was inadmissible. Id. at 162 (majority opinion). The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that before a confession could be deemed involuntary,
there must be “coercive police activity.” Since there was none here, it was not
involuntary. Id. at 166–67.
38. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1940) (current version at FED. R. CRIM. P. 5).
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
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prosecution. The rule was never constitutionally required, and it was
eventually supplanted by Miranda.41
In the 1960s, the Warren Court dramatically reshaped the way society
dealt with criminals and criminal suspects.42 Prior to that time, protections
afforded defendants in state criminal proceedings, where most criminal
cases are tried, were often limited. The Bill of Rights applied only to the
federal government, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which did apply to the
states, gave criminal defendants only those fundamental rights deemed
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.43 In the 1960s, the Supreme Court
began to read the Fourteenth Amendment in a new manner. Instead of
looking for fundamental rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
it moved to “selective incorporation” of provisions contained in the Bill
of Rights.44 By moving to this approach, the Supreme Court led a revolution
in American criminal procedure and provided all of the following rights
to state criminal defendants: the freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures and the exclusionary rule;45 the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment;46 the right to assistance of counsel in felony
cases;47 the privilege against self-incrimination;48 the right to confront
opposing witnesses;49 the right to a speedy trial;50 the right to compel
defense witnesses to appear at trial;51 the right to a jury trial;52 and protection
against double jeopardy.53 In 1972, the death penalty was declared

41. The Miranda opinion briefly notes both the history of the “third degree” in
America and the danger of false confessions. It described the modern interrogation
process as “psychologically rather than physically oriented.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 447–48 (1966).
42. Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the
Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361,
1363–64 (2004); BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CRIMINAL LAW REVOLUTION
1960–1968 (1968); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A QuarterCentury Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1 (1995). For recent articles reflecting on the
criminal justice decisions of the Warren Court, see Symposium, The Warren Court
Criminal Justice Revolution: Reflections a Generation Later, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1
(2005).
43. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
44. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. Id. at 655.
46. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962).
47. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963).
48. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
49. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965).
50. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1967).
51. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967).
52. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968).
53. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795–96 (1969).
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unconstitutional as it was then applied,54 and in 1973, states were prohibited
from outlawing abortions in the early stages of pregnancy.55
Regarding interrogations and confessions, the Supreme Court first
adopted a rule based upon the Sixth Amendment. Massiah v. United
States prohibited the police from “deliberately eliciting” statements from
an individual after the initiation of judicial proceedings—indictment,
information, arraignment, or preliminary hearing—without an attorney
being present.56 The following month, in Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court
created the “focus” test, enforcing a right to counsel at the point when an
investigation focuses on the accused with the purpose of eliciting a
confession.57 A year later, the Court issued the now-familiar Miranda
rules.58
Miranda’s demand that suspects be advised of their right to remain
silent and their right to have an attorney present during questioning,
combined with the exclusion of statements taken in violation of those
rights, caused a shift in the landscape of criminal procedure.59 The
voluntariness rule remained in place, as did Massiah’s prohibition on
interfering with a suspect’s right to counsel.60 Miranda, however, required
54. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam). See generally
Ronald J. Rychlak, Defense Counsel and the Death Penalty: An Obligation to Oppose
the Theory Behind the Punishment?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 371 (2004).
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). See Ronald J. Rychlak, Abortion,
Thinking Americans, and Judicial Politics, 14 U. FAC. FOR LIFE: LIFE & LEARNING CONF.
PROC. 77 (2004), available at http://www.uffl.org/Vol14/rychlak-04.pdf.
56. 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
57. 378 U.S. 478, 491–92 (1964).
58. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of incustody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will
to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately
and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be
fully honored.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
59. See Roxane J. Perruso, And Then There Were Three: Colorado’s New Death
Penalty Sentencing Statute, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 189, 190 (1997) (explaining that within
two years of Furman, twenty-nine states had enacted new death penalty statutes).
60. The Massiah test remains viable, but Escobedo does not. See Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347
(1976). Thus, the government can deliberately elicit information after a suspect has
become the focus of the investigation, but prior to the start of formal proceedings. In
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 163–68 (1985), for instance, police secretly recorded
meetings between the defendant and his codefendant, who was cooperating with the
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that police inform suspects about their legal rights. The practical effect
of Miranda was that suspects who had confessed to crimes were
occasionally set free.61 For that reason, it was a very controversial
decision.62
III. SELF-INCRIMINATION IN THE TERRORISM CONTEXT
Even if some interrogators are able to use Miranda to help them obtain
statements, the rules are certainly designed to help suspects invoke their
right not to incriminate themselves.63 If those rules are serving their
intended purpose, they are making life harder for interrogators and
prosecutors. Logically, then, they would have the same impact on those
trying to gain information to assist with the war on terror. The question
is whether the same concerns that justify protection against selfincrimination in domestic criminal cases are applicable when it comes to
the war on international terrorism. The two primary concerns are: false
testimony elicited during interrogation, and the related issue of brutal
police. The conversations related to crimes that had already been charged and other
crimes where there were no charges. The Court held that conversations relating to
pending charges had to be excluded, but conversations relating to other criminal activity
did not have to be excluded. Id. at 180. Similarly, in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S.
171, 175–76 (1991), the Court found statements were admissible where they related only
to criminal activity not yet charged and were gained from a person in custody who had
invoked his right to an attorney.
61. Within two years of the Miranda decision, Congress tried to change the legal
landscape. Taking heed of Justice John Harlan’s dissenting opinion that the “social costs
of crime are too great to call the new [Miranda] rules anything but a hazardous
experimentation,” 384 U.S. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting), Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §
3501, which said: “In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the
District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be
admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given . . . .” Congress left no doubt that the
purpose of § 3501 was to reverse the holding in Miranda. The statute provided that,
when the trial court is deciding whether a confession is voluntary, it should take into
account all circumstances surrounding the confession, including whether Miranda-type
warnings were given. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(3) (1968). The absence of such warnings,
however, would not preclude admissibility of an otherwise voluntary confession. Id.
§ 3501(b)(5). This section was ruled unconstitutional in United States v. Dickerson, 530
U.S. 428, 442–44 (2000).
62. The dynamics of this period of activity for the Supreme Court must be placed
into context. The state criminal laws had been established by the political process. In
other words, the situation as it was before these cases reflected the will of the majority of
persons living in any given state. To much of the public, the Warren Court reforms
meant that criminals were being set free by the courts, even when guilt was not in
question. Since most of these issues were held to be required by the Constitution,
however, state political action could not change the law. As to the death penalty,
however, the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision left open the possibility of applying it in a
constitutional manner. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310–11 (1972) (White, J.,
concurring). By 1974, twenty-nine states had acted to restore the death penalty. Perruso,
supra note 59, at 190.
63. SIMON, supra note 35, at 197–98.
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tactics being used by police authorities in order to elicit incriminating
statements.64
A. Concern about False Confessions and Bad Information
If suspects are forced to speak, investigators might get false
confessions or other bad information.65 Consider the case of Brown v.
Mississippi, in which the defendant’s conviction was based solely on a
confession induced by beatings.66 He had been hanged twice by the
local deputy and other men—the marks on neck were still visible at
trial—then whipped.67 When he would not confess, he was released
only to be picked up two days later, whipped again, and told that the
whippings would continue until he confessed and agreed in every detail
that the deputy suggested.68 The defendant’s story, in fact, changed
several times to fit the facts as they were explained to him.69 The
confession was admitted at trial, and the jury convicted and sentenced
him to death.70 The U.S. Supreme Court held that this violated the
64. As early as 866, Pope St. Nicholas I wrote:
If a [putative] thief or bandit is apprehended and denies the charges against
him, you tell me your custom is for a judge to beat him with blows to the head
and tear the sides of his body with other sharp iron goads until he confesses the
truth. Such a procedure is totally unacceptable under both divine and human
law, since a confession should be spontaneous and not forced. It should be
proffered voluntarily, not violently extorted. After all, if it should happen that
even after inflicting all these torments, you still fail to wrest from the sufferer
any self-incrimination regarding the crime of which he is accused, will you not
then at least blush for shame and acknowledge how impious is your judicial
procedure? Likewise, suppose an accused man is unable to endure such
torments and so confesses to a crime he never committed. Upon whom, pray
tell, will now devolve the full brunt of responsibility for such an enormity, if
not upon him who coerced the accused into confessing such lies about himself?
Letter from Pope St. Nicholas I to Boris, Bulgarian Prince (866), reprinted in Brian W.
Harrison, The Church and Torture, THIS ROCK, Dec. 2006, at 23, 27.
65. See, e.g., PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY:
WINNING WITHOUT WAR 109–11 (2003); Sanford Levinson, “Precommitment” and
“Postcommitment”: The Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV.
2013, 2028–29 (2003); Jan Hoffman, Police Refine Methods So Potent, Even the
Innocent Have Confessed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at Al; Thomas H. Maugh II,
Glendale Case Raises Issue of Reliability of Confessions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at
Al.
66. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
67. Id. at 281.
68. Id. at 282.
69. Id. at 282.
70. Id. at 279.
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Fourteenth Amendment.71 In fact, it called the Mississippi Supreme
Court decision upholding the conviction a denial of due process in and
of itself.72
As illustrated in the Brown case, and totally aside from the related
concern for the just treatment of citizens, unrestrained interrogation may
lead to bad information that adequately serves neither the purpose of
criminal justice, nor the nation’s fight against terrorism.73 Moreover, not
only physical abuse elicits false confessions and bad information.
Mental duress can also lead to false confessions.
The case of William N. Oatis is an interesting example of mental
pressure leading to a false confession.74 In 1951, Oatis, an American
citizen, was taken into Czech custody on charges of espionage while
working as bureau chief for the Associated Press in Prague.75 He was
innocent, but he signed a false confession after being interrogated for six
days.76 Oatis described how he felt after having been kept awake for
over forty-two straight hours in an article for Life magazine:
The room was whirling. I could not seem to make my eyes—or my brain—
focus. I wanted time to think. I knew that this was a great and perhaps fatal
step: if I signed, I would be confessing to something I had not done. I wanted to
consider what I might be doing to myself by signing this document—and what I
might be doing by refusing to sign it. But there was something else I wanted
more. That was sleep. I had been awake 42 hours. Through that time, almost
without letup, I had been questioned, browbeaten, and berated. I was limp with
fatigue. My eyes kept falling shut, my mind kept blanking out. My future
might lie in the balance, but the future must take care of itself. Tomorrow was
another day. Tonight was what bore me down. I must end it somehow. There
seemed only one way to do that, and that was to sign the confession. So I
signed it. The 42 hours had finished me. I had gone to embassy people for help
in my unofficial reporting, a procedure followed by journalists everywhere, but
now I had confessed the opposite. I had signed a paper saying I went to the
embassy to deliver information rather than to obtain it. I had not chosen to
abandon the truth—the choice had been made for me . . . .77

71. Id. at 287.
72. Id. at 285–86.
73. Nat Hentoff, Prisons of Darkness: CIA Leads U.S. in ‘Reaching for the Low
Moral Ground’ in the War Against Terrorism, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 2, 2005, at 26,
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0549,hentoff,70638,6.html.
74. Rayner Pike, AP Reporter William Oatis Dies, Sept. 16, 1997, http://www.
oatis.com/memorial/obit.html (“On the first day I admitted that I had done unofficial
reporting, which I had; within three days I confessed that this was espionage, which—by
any Western standard—it was not; and within seven days I confessed that I had spied for
the U.S. government—which was a lie.”).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Human Rights Watch, Descriptions of Techniques Allegedly Authorized by
the CIA, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/11/21/usdom12071.htm [hereinafter Human
Rights Watch, Descriptions] (last visited Sept. 13, 2007); Human Rights Watch, CIA
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Obviously, false confessions are a concern for police or other intelligencegathering authorities.78 The right not to incriminate oneself helps protect
against the danger of possible misinformation.79
False confessions obtained in criminal cases have often been driven by
animus based on factors such as race, politics, the desire of police
authorities to “close” a case, or other personal interests.80 Such factors could
impact a terror-related interrogation, but the risk is significantly lower,
in part because investigators in one context would necessarily possess
different goals than investigators in the other. In regular criminal
investigations, the goal is to obtain a conviction of the suspect. Thus,
the statement is valuable to the prosecution regardless of whether it is
accurate.
Interrogators in the terrorism context, however, are seeking information,
not trying to get a conviction. They seem to think that pressure—physical
or nonphysical—is more beneficial than not, and they are in the best
position to evaluate the risk of bad information from aggressive interrogation.
Interrogators know the risks of false confessions, and yet, in every
society, they continually return to forceful methods of interrogation.81
Those outside of the terrorism investigation community are not close
enough to the action to successfully prove that the risk of false confessions
is sufficiently serious so as to justify providing terrorist suspects with the
right not to incriminate themselves.82 Accordingly, and without meaning
to condone overly aggressive interrogation, much less torture, this “potentially
Whitewashing Torture: Statements by Goss Contradict U.S. Law and Practice, http://hrw.org/
english/docs/2005/11/21/usdom12069.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
78. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 28, at 429.
79. See also Ross, supra note 22, at 5.
80. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting
the Innocent?, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 121, 131–32 (2006) (exploring the impact of race
on interrogation).
81. Levinson, supra note 65, at 2030. “The sad fact is that, for much of history,
actual torture was a regular part of the judicial processes of virtually every human
society—and not because it was ineffective. This debate should be framed in terms of
policy and morality, not on false claims of futility.” Rivkin & Casey, supra note 12, at
A11. See also infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text (forceful techniques more
necessary in terror-related cases).
82. Compare Cassell, supra note 28, at 527–29, with Richard A. Leo & Richard J.
Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 558 (1998) (“Not only is Cassell’s thesis that ‘Miranda
affirmatively harms the innocent’ unsupported by any evidence, it also flies in the face of
reason.”).
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bad information” argument is an insufficient justification for the right not
to incriminate oneself, at least in a terrorism-related situation.83 The
argument certainly does not justify the Miranda rule being applied in
such a context.
B. The “Slippery Slope” Argument
Another argument in support of the right not to incriminate oneself is
that without such a right, police officers might be tempted to coerce
suspects into making statements, perhaps sliding into overly aggressive
interrogation or even torture.84 The concern here is that “if torture is
condoned in the extreme case of the known terrorist who has certainly
planted the ticking time-bomb, security officers will come to believe that
they hear bombs ticking everywhere, and will use torture against people
merely suspected of posing a security threat.”85
This may be a particularly serious threat in the terrorism context.86
When it comes to routine criminal investigations, many authorities have
concluded that harsh practices associated with “the third degree” are less
effective in obtaining truthful statements than psychologically oriented
83. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, Moral Prohibition at a Price, in TORTURE, supra
note 22, at 18, 25–26. See also supra note 81 (quoting Rivkin & Casey, supra note 12,
at A11).
84. See generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361
(1985); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026
(2003).
85. Michael C. Dorf, Renouncing Torture, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA
247, 250 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006) (“Only by prohibiting torture under all
circumstances, such laws assume, can we prevent an extremely limited authorization, for
torture in extreme circumstances, from becoming a license for routine torture.”). See
also Krauthammer, supra note 9.
86. Of course, the first question is to reach a consensus on the meaning of
“torture.” The practice lacks a clear definition in international agreements and in
American law. See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 279–81 & n.9. As Richard Posner, U.S.
Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago
Law School, has noted: “Almost all official interrogation is coercive, yet not all coercive
interrogation would be called ‘torture’ by any competent user of the English language, so
that what is involved in using the word is picking out the point along a continuum at
which the observer’s queasiness turns to revulsion.” Richard Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and
Interrogation, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 291, 291 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004). In
other words, there is a continuum of pressure that can be applied during interrogation,
ranging from an uncomfortable chair and warm lights to extreme physical abuse, and
perhaps even worse. Moreover, there are at least four different reasons why torture
might be used: as punishment, for the enjoyment of the person inflicting the torture, to
extract a confession of criminal activity, and to obtain information so as to prevent
greater harm—the “ticking bomb” scenario. According to Father Brian Harrison, O.S., a
professor at the Pontifical University of Puerto Rico, the Catholic Church has
condemned the first three reasons for inflicting torture, but—perhaps tellingly—has not
expressly condemned torture in the fourth situation. Harrison, supra note 64, at 27. See
also Krauthammer, supra note 9 (arguing along similar lines).
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techniques designed to reduce the suspect’s resistance in typical criminal
investigation.87 In terror-related situations, however, the evidence suggests
that more civil interrogation tactics are not as successful.88 Consider:
As Posner and others have tartly pointed out, if torture and coercion were both
as useless as critics pretend, why is there so much of it going on? While some
abuse and outright torture can be attributed to the sadism of individuals, poor
supervision, and so on, it must be the case that other acts of torture occur
because interrogators believe, in good faith, that torture is the only way to
extract information in a timely fashion. It must also be the case that if experienced
interrogators come to this conclusion, they do so on the basis of their experience.
The argument that torture and coercion do not work is contradicted by the dire
frequency with which both practices occur.89

Indeed, the events of September 11, 2001, have caused serious scholars to
debate the previously unthinkable prospect of legalized torture.90
The Supreme Court has defended the Fifth Amendment right to not
incriminate oneself as a solution to the “cruel trilemma” of self-incrimination,
perjury, or contempt that faces a defendant who is required to offer
testimony in his or her own case.91 At a fundamental level, this is a moral
decision, rather than a pragmatic one.92 It does not follow, however, that

87. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 28, at 434 n.10 (“Interrogators may have become
more effective at obtaining confession statements than they were in the prior era of third
degree interrogation.”).
88. YOO, supra note 8, at 189.
89. Ignatieff, supra note 83, at 25–26.
90. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002) (suggesting the creation of a warrant
for torture); Posner, supra note 86; Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:
Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005); Anthony Lewis,
Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 2004; Dershowitz: Torture Could Be
Justified, CNN.COM/LAW CENTER, Mar. 4, 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/03/
cnna.Dershowitz/ (Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz discussing the possibility).
Human Rights Watch put together a list of forms of torture that the CIA allegedly has
authorized. Human Rights Watch, Descriptions, supra note 77.
91. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). In fact, it is not clear
that the trilemma is as cruel as some would make it. As Justice Scalia has argued, “This
‘trilemma’ is wholly of the guilty suspect’s own making, of course. An innocent person
will not find himself in a similar quandary (as one commentator has put it, the innocent
person lacks even a ‘lemma’ . . .).” Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 404 (1998)
(quoting Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process,
and Magic Bullets, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 1016 (1996)).
92. There are those who argue that the law should not impose moral values.
Without delving into that argument in other contexts, it is certainly legitimate for a
society to decide that authorities who are acting on behalf of the public should behave in
a moral manner. See generally Rychlak, supra note 55.
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moral concerns would justify the same rules in a terror-related
scenario.93
Counterterrorism is different from regular law enforcement in ways
that may make some form of aggressive interrogation justifiable, if not
necessary. Normal law enforcement is “designed to punish and deter,
rather than prevent, criminal conduct.”94 The goal of counterterrorism units,
in contrast, is to “discover and pre-empt future suicide attacks before
they take place.”95 At the same time, few, if any, citizens want to give
interrogators full discretion to do whatever they wish.96 Elimination of
all rules and the threat of sanctions for the interrogators would open the
possibility of widespread abuse.
The Christian view of human nature and sin suggests that we are fallible
creatures and thus not good at empire. We cannot be trusted with domination,
becoming too easily corrupted by its power and too often succumbing to
repression in defending it. Therefore, we should not simply be shocked at the
evil we have seen in the horrible prison photos, but also sobered and saddened
by that same potential in ourselves.97

93. See National Council of Churches USA & Church World Service General
Assembly, A Statement on the Disavowal of Torture, Nov. 2005, http://www.ncccusa.org/
about/policies.html (“Torture, regardless of circumstance, humiliates and debases
torturer and tortured alike.”). The Catechism of the Catholic Church provides:
Torture which uses physical or moral violence to extract confessions, punish
the guilty, frighten opponents, or satisfy hatred is contrary to respect for the
person and for human dignity. Except when performed for strictly therapeutic
medical reasons, directly intended amputations, mutilations, and sterilizations
performed on innocent persons are against the moral law.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH para. 2297, at 553 (Libreria Editrice Vaticana
trans., 2d ed. 2000). The Catechism goes on to state:
In times past, cruel practices were commonly used by legitimate governments
to maintain law and order . . . . In recent times it has become evident that these
cruel practices were neither necessary for public order, nor in conformity with
the legitimate rights of the human person. On the contrary, these practices led
to ones even more degrading. It is necessary to work for their abolition. We
must pray for the victims and their tormentors.
Id. para. 2298, at 553.
94. David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Claims and Counterclaims, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 5, 2006, at A20.
95. Id.
96. Even when in extremis situations may occur, one would expect that, in those
cases, governments would not seek to rationalize these actions or justify them,
but, in following Henry David Thoreau, acknowledge such abhorrent individual
practices when done to avoid a greater imminent and certain harm, and submit
those who engage in them to the legal consequences for their violations.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Great Nations and Torture, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA,
supra note 85, at 256, 259.
97. Jim Wallis, The Theology of Torture, SOJOURNERS MAG., Aug. 2004, at 5, 5.
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Waterboarding has already been publicly defended.98 What about
beatings, amputations, or inflicting pain on members of the suspect’s
family? Obviously, if the controls are completely lifted, it is easy to
imagine interrogators going too far.99 As one commentator has noted, “It
is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a
poor devil’s eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence.”100
Therefore, the “slippery slope” argument for the right not to incriminate
oneself does apply to the terrorism scenario. Some controls must be
kept in place in these situations.
IV. CONTROLS ON TERROR-RELATED INTERROGATIONS
Even though there is some reason to place restrictions on interrogation,
even in the terrorism scenario, Miranda-style protections are not

98. On September 20, 2006, television host Bill O’Reilly had Brian Ross of ABC
News on his show. Ross had just done research into aggressive interrogation. He found
that fourteen detainees with very important information about future terror plots broke
down and talked after being subjected to waterboarding. He reported that the toughest
suspect broke down in two and a half minutes but that most only lasted for thirty seconds.
Ross admitted that it probably could kill someone, but the key aspect of waterboarding is
that it makes the subject feel like he is drowning, triggering an uncontrollable gag reflex.
See Harrison, supra note 64, at 24. For a report critical of O’Reilly’s take on this
issue, see Bill O’Reilly Endorses Waterboarding as Safe and Reliable, N EWS
HOUNDS, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.newshounds.us/2006/09/20/ bill_oreilly_endorses_water
boarding_as_safe_and_reliable.php.
99. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Krauthammer, supra note 9.
100. Ross, supra note 22, at 16 (quoting 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 442 n.1 (1883)). Consider also:
Unlike a surgical procedure or a research methodology, torture is not easily
susceptible to precision and restraint in application. Its internal dynamic
makes it prone to ever wider use. Victims become inured to pain, inviting ever
harsher and more imaginative measures, and no interrogator wants to “soften
up” a subject just to have the next guy on the shift get the payoff when the
prisoner cracks. The very commission of brutality engages the emotions, impelling
the torturer to resolve ambivalence toward seeing the victim as ever more
deserving of harsh treatment, as we see in the taunts of female guards toward
prisoners who urinated on themselves from fear of guard dogs. Torture, like
power, appears to be habit-forming. The rationale of torture in an age of
terror—averting imminent and massive harm to civilians by torturing the right
source—easily slides to cover ever more remote sources and more hypothetical
harms. It is difficult to torture just a little.
Dinah Pokempner, Command Responsibility for Torture, in TORTURE, supra note 22, at
158, 167.
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appropriate in such a context.101 As one Congressman said, “There’s not
a single member of this Congress that believes that Miranda warnings
should be given to terrorists.”102
First, it is not even clear that Miranda has been successful in meeting
its goal of protecting the right not to incriminate oneself in a general
criminal context. For instance, we know that there are some officers who
would lie, denying brutal or coercive conduct that resulted in a statement
from the suspect. Those same officers are likely to testify falsely that
they gave appropriate Miranda warnings.103 Even more problematic, a
suspect who made an incriminating statement can claim that Miranda
warnings were not given, raising a difficult issue of fact. As Justice
Douglas stated in a pre-Miranda case, the “trial on the issue of coercion
is seldom helpful,” with police officers “usually testify[ing] one way, the
accused another.”104 Miranda does little to change this problem. It
merely creates a fact question, and the prosecution has the burden of
proof to show that the suspect understood his or her rights before
waiving them.
Miranda is, essentially, an exclusionary rule. Statements taken in violation
of Miranda cannot be used against the defendant in a subsequent
prosecution, but if the suspect who was interrogated is not prosecuted,
the exclusionary aspect of Miranda has no application. Moreover, there
are many exceptions that negate Miranda’s effect in specific cases.105
101. The criminal justice system is fundamentally reactive. It can punish
individual perpetrators, but it can prevent future crimes only through
deterrence. Deterrence, of course, works well enough on the domestic level, in
a society where most individuals are law-abiding to begin with, and others fear
the consequences of a criminal conviction. It does not work at all where the
bad actors, or at least a substantial number of them, are already willing to die
in order to kill.
Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., How to Treat a Captured Terrorist: Getting to the
Heart of an Important Question, NAT’L REV., July 4, 2005, at 20, 20.
102. Anne Plummer Flaherty, Tribunals for Detainees Backed, DESERET MORNING
NEWS (Salt Lake City), July 13, 2006, at A2 (quoting Rep. G.K. Butterfield (D-N.C.), a
retired judge who served on North Carolina’s Supreme Court).
103. Moreover:
[T]here is good reason to believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Miranda has exacerbated the risks to the innocent. The Miranda decision has
reduced the number of truthful confessions, while at the same time doing
nothing about, and probably even worsening, the false confession problem by
diverting the focus of courts away from the substantive truth of confessions to
procedural issues about how they were obtained.
Cassell, supra note 28, at 526–27.
104. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443–44 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(noting that the nature of the process gives defendants “little chance to prove coercion”
at trial).
105. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (recognizing an
exception for questioning prompted by concern for public safety); Harris v. New York,
401 U. S. 222, 225 (1971); Bowen v. State, 607 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (Miss. 1992) (holding
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There is also a certain lack of logic in a rule that assumes that any
statement taken prior to the receipt of warnings must be coerced, yet
does not assume that waivers of the right to remain silent or to have an
attorney present for questioning have similarly been coerced.106 Some
commentators even believe that the police have learned to work with the
Miranda rules so well that they have become nothing more than minor
inconveniences, or perhaps even tools that the authorities can exploit in
an interrogation.107
Miranda’s protections also come with a cost in terms of lost convictions.108
Scholars have attempted to obtain empirical evidence regarding confessions
and the impact of Miranda, but difficulty in gathering and evaluating the
evidence has led to inconclusive results.109 Some commentators argue
that Miranda’s costs, in terms of lost convictions, are too great to justify
the benefits it supplies; they claim that “thousands of violent criminals
that when a defendant is entitled to Miranda warnings and does not receive them, any
voluntary statement made by him may be used for impeachment purposes).
106. As pointed out by Justice White:
[I]f the defendant may not answer . . . a question such as “Where were you last
night?” without having his answer be a compelled one, how can the Court ever
accept his negative answer to the question of whether he wants to consult his
retained counsel or counsel whom the court will appoint?
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
107. Consider the following passage:
Yet more than two decades after the landmark Escobedo and Miranda
decisions, the rest of the world remains strangely willing to place itself at risk.
As a result, the same law enforcement community that once regarded the 1966
Miranda decision as a death blow to criminal investigation has now come to
see the explanation of rights as a routine part of the process—simply a piece of
station house furniture, if not a civilizing influence on police work itself.
SIMON, supra note 35, at 199.
108. This, in and of itself, could be considered a moral violation of duty by the
government. Consider:
The murderer, as the man guilty of the most extreme form of physical coercion,
must without exception be put to death. But, it must be noted, coercion against
evildoers is the required and inescapable duty of the civil authority. God
requires coercion in the suppression of lawlessness. Without godly coercion,
the world is surrendered into the hands of ungodly coercion. No man wants a
hose of water turned against his living room, but, in case of fire, that water is a
necessity and a welcome help. Similarly, coercion is a God-ordained necessity
to enable man to cope with outbreaks of lawlessness.
ROUSAS JOHN RUSHDOONY, THE INSTITUTES OF BIBLICAL LAW 292 (3d prtg. 1976).
109. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 5, at 291. See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s
“Negligible” Effect on Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 327, 332 (1997). As one British court noted, the right not to testify elicits
“strong but unfocused” feelings. R v. Dir. of Serious Fraud Office, [1993] A.C. 1, 26–33
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.) (Lord Mustill).
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escape justice each year as a direct result of Miranda.”110 As one noted
critic of Miranda has argued:
Evidence of Miranda’s harmful effects is mounting. For example, along with
various co-authors, I have developed empirical evidence of Miranda’s substantial harm
to law enforcement. In my most recent articles, I have analyzed the precipitous drop
in crime clearance rates that followed immediately on the heels of Miranda and
concluded that Miranda severely hampered police effectiveness.111

Others commentators argue that the cost of Miranda is minimal and the
significant benefits include protection of the innocent and better control
over the police.112
Whatever the cost may be in the criminal context, terrorism shifts the
balance of the equation. The risk of a single criminal going free is relatively
small. Large terror-related organizations are a different matter. “[T]he
harm any individual ordinary criminal can inflict, if wrongly freed, is
limited. The potential harm an al Qaeda operative can inflict is potentially
enormous.”113 Criminal laws have long been written so as to recognize
the additional danger associated with joint or group activity. Similarly,
the extraordinary danger posed by international terror organizations must
be recognized by the law.114
In a criminal investigation, if police questioning is prompted by an
immediate concern for public safety, the Supreme Court has held that the
officers may question the suspect without first providing Miranda
warnings.115 The suspect’s answers to these questions may be used not
only to avert the immediate threat, but also as evidence in a subsequent
criminal prosecution against the suspect. That does not mean, of course,
that any and all tactics are legitimate when an officer is motivated by
public safety concerns. Limits must still be set to protect suspects from
overly aggressive interrogation. Note, though, that the United States Supreme
110. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 687 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Paul G.
Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing The Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Miranda’s Harmful Effects On Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, (1998)), rev’d,
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
111. Cassell, supra note 28, at 531. “The innocent are at risk not only from
false confessions, but also from ‘lost’ confessions—that is, confessions that police fail
to obtain from guilty criminals that might help innocent persons who would otherwise
come under suspicion for committing a crime,” or become a victim of the criminals who
did not confess. Id. at 525.
112. See SUSAN M. EASTON, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 60–62 (1991) (arguing that the
innocent are protected by the right to silence); Dennis, supra note 20, at 348 (describing
protection of innocent against wrongful conviction as justification for privilege).
113. YOO, supra note 8, at 201.
114. See Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S.
Department of State, Terrorist Threats Against America, Testimony to the Committee on
International Relations (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/ 2001/
5215.htm (discussing the extraordinary danger posed by international terror organizations).
115. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984).
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Court has concluded that Miranda is not the appropriate instrument to
protect those suspects.116
In a terrorism situation, every interrogation—at least every one that is
hypothesized when discussing the ticking bomb scenario—can be said to
be prompted by a concern for the public safety. That does not, however,
mean that every investigation tactic can be justified in the terrorism
scenario. If aggressive interrogations take place, innocent parties sometimes
will be mistaken for legitimate suspects. Likewise, aggressive techniques
used to obtain information will not always be justified. In those cases where
aggressive techniques are used to obtain information, governmental officials
should be subject to proceedings and possible punishment.117
Unlike Miranda, the approach being advanced here would require that
the analysis and evaluation of the interrogation take place after the fact.118
In a terrorism-related situation, it is not possible to develop in advance a
one-size-fits-all template to determine what level of pressure can or
should be applied to a given suspect and a particular threat. Therefore, a
post hoc inquiry is reasonable to assess the response to the nature of the
threat, the complexity of the issues involved, and the variety of factual
scenarios from one case to the next. Various principles and limitations
designed to protect detainees from overly abusive tactics, however, can
and should be established.119 It can be assumed that over time, courts
116. Id.
117. Two issues that require further development include where responsibility
should attach and whether low-ranking officials who are ordered to carry out aggressive
interrogations should be able to invoke the “Nuremberg defense.” See generally Frank
Lawrence, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 397 (1989).
German government officials, industrialists, and military leaders, whom the
Allies accused of committing international crimes, presented the “original”
Nuremberg Defense. These defendants argued that they should not be held
personally responsible for their actions because they were not top government
officials, they had not formulated policy, they were following superior orders,
and that international law did not apply to individuals.
Id. at 413.
118. “Judges are good at focusing on what has happened in the past. Whether an
attack might occur in the future, its magnitude and how to stop it are beyond their usual
expertise.” YOO, supra note 8, at 201. When it comes to terrorism, the same might be
said of legislators and regulators.
119. A thorough examination of potential approaches is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, it is not difficult to imagine any number of possible approaches. For
example, Israeli law allows authorities to delay a suspect’s meeting with counsel for
various increments of time, depending on the severity of the charges, the potential for
future crime, and the severity of future crime. This approach, of course, brings its own
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and administrators will develop guidelines, limitations, and practices
designed to protect suspects and detainees.
V. CONCLUSION
There are several risks associated with aggressive interrogation in
criminal cases. While the issues change in terrorism-related situations,
there are still reasons to provide terror suspects some level of protection
from abusive interrogation techniques. The justifiable level of pressure
to be applied in any given case cannot be decided with certainty in
advance, but interrogators should not be given free reign. That being
said, Miranda is not the appropriate way to enforce those limitations in
the terrorism scenario. Rather, after-the-fact judicial or quasi-judicial
investigations should look at all the facts and evaluate the actions of the
interrogating authorities in light of what they knew at the time.120
After-the-fact judicial or quasi-judicial investigations give government
authorities flexibility to deal with interrogation problems that are impossible
to foresee but likely to develop. This approach strikes a balance between
the two competing needs—information to combat terrorism and just
treatment of all detainees—and succeeds where Miranda fails because it
holds interrogators responsible if they “cross the line,” but does not stop
the flow of information. This approach is not perfect; it will not stop all
overly abusive tactics. The same, of course, can be said of Miranda and
almost every other device used to protect against abusive interrogation.
In the war on terror, part of the battle is to thwart the enemy, and part
of the battle is to maintain moral standards. These goals will sometimes
compete with each other. It is therefore important to remember that military
actions are fundamentally different from criminal investigations. We can
not expect criminal law doctrines to work appropriately in every military
situation. We must, however, maintain a basic level of morality in how
we carry out government activities, including military operations. This
potential for abuse, as noted by at least one author. Rinat Kitai, A Custodial Suspect’s
Right to the Assistance of Counsel—The Ambivalence of Israeli Law Against the
Background of American Law, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 205, 220–21, 233–34 (2004). Some
authors have argued that further exceptions to Miranda should be established. See
Darmer, supra note 15, at 351–53 (arguing that courts should carve out a “foreign
interrogation” exception to Miranda, in the same manner that Quarles carved out a
“public safety” exception). Some merely argue that Miranda be suspended in terrorism
investigations and that subsequent information gathered be barred from any use in trial or
tribunal. One is forced to wonder how that particular approach differs from Miranda’s
normal function of excluding evidence obtained in violation of its requirements.
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing after the Terror, 111 YALE L. J. 2137, 2186–94 (2002).
120. In this manner, the standard and the investigation would be similar to the one
undertaken to assess effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
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may be difficult, but it is necessary if we are to battle terrorism, maintain
our integrity, and retain our national identity.
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